

Week 13 Presentation Notes

Plan:

0. Introduction

1. How things look to Huw, “at the end of the day”, that is, at this late stage of the conversation.
2. My redescription of the situation, in terms of pragmatic MVs vs. representational semantic MVs, “dividing through by naturalism” and then “dividing through by representationalism”.
3. A Disagreement with Price, about the need for relatively robust *semantic* metavocabularies at the level of all declaratives—so, a matter of what is involved in e-representation. I think a notion of conceptual content robust enough to do formal semantics with is required.
4. The complications I add. These include needing to distinguish ADPs, idioms (not ADPs) that are metavocabularies, and categorial metavocabulary idioms, by giving suitable characterizations of them in pragmatic metavocabularies.
5. In connection with (3) some examples to consider:
 - 0) metaphysical vocabulary. I won’t pursue this, but want to put it on the table as something others might want to look into.
 - a) Example of number-talk (use of numerals).
 - b) Example of normative vocabulary (an idiom I claim to be a categorial metavocabulary idiom).

End of plan.

0. Introduction:

1. Early on:

Talk about a bit of the envisaged course I haven't found room for:

Blackburn's development, from opposing Rorty as "antirealist" about everything to embracing a kind of pragmatism, seeing his development of HEX as a pragmatism. In my terms, this is taking it that some idioms should be treated first in a pragmatic MV, and then given only a minimally representational semantic treatment, of the kind suitable to any declaratives.

SB originally positions himself between realists and antirealists—hence "quasirealism."

Key move for him is that anything expressible in declarative terms has a genuinely representational dimension, even though it is not description or representational in a narrow sense, which applies only to other idioms, paradigmatically OED and object-naturalist idioms.

His is a recognizably a kind of subject naturalism.

And it depends on both rejecting an E-representational semantic analysis of some idioms (the "3 'M's'"), and on embracing an I-representational analysis of even those idioms, on the basis that they are declarative idioms (an declaratives are an idiom-kind).

I wanted to rehearse the gradual path he takes to endorsing a convergence between his sort of Humean expressivism and Price's form of post-Rortyan pragmatism.

But I have not found space for a detailed consideration of the interesting phases of Blackburn's development on this point.

1. How things look to Huw, "at the end of the day", that is, at this late stage of the conversation.

Price's "pentagulation" in "Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences" (2009):

- i) the so-called 'Canberra Plan';
- ii) Moorean non-naturalism and platonism;
- iii) 'relaxed realism' and quietism;
- iv) local expressivism; and
- v) response-dependent realism.

(i) is invidious object naturalism: representational semantics for all (respectable) declaratives. The rest second class.

(ii) accepts representational semantic presuppositions, but insists a *non*naturalist representational semantic metavocabulary shd be used for *some* expressions. Not invidious: there are two flavors of first class expressions: naturalistic and nonnaturalistic.

HP: Should reject the shared presupposition of (i) and (ii).

(iii) On the right track, but is *too* quietist. It leaves out the possibility, intelligibility, and desirability of a positive theoretical task: giving subject naturalist accounts.

(iv) distinction with HP's view is subtle.

Local expressivists want to distinguish idioms for which one should give pragmatic account and those for which one should give a representationalist semantic account.

HP wants

- to give pragmatist account of *all* declaratives.
- Accept that there is a representational dimension to all of them: i-representational. They are truth-evaluable in a deflationary sense, and fact-stating and propositionally contentful in a deflated sense. My account of asserting and Huw's will do here.
- For some special idioms, should *also* give a more narrowly descriptive-representational (e-representational) account.

I'll have more to say about the options for this narrow descriptivist semantic account later.

(v) Looks to give a truth-conditional semantic account (rather than a pragmatic account) of some idioms. But identifies a special kind of property, response-dependent properties, that definitionally involve reference to dispositions of subjects.

Here the objection is (compare: non-naturalism and Platonism) that a semantic account is being offered where a pragmatic one is wanted.

Ends by endorsing "Pittsburgh pragmatism" of Sellars and Brandom (not McD) and wanting it to be synthesized with "Cambridge pragmatism," which unites him and Blackburn's variety of Humean expressivism.

2. My redescription of the situation,

in terms of pragmatic MVs vs. representational semantic MVs, "dividing through by naturalism" and then "dividing through by representationalism".

3. A Disagreement with Price:

Giving up on semantic MVs (which is Rorty's recommendation) is really not an option.

Price and I both think that post-Rortyan pragmatism—pragmatism after he gave pragmatism the linguistic turn, as epitomized in the 'vocabulary' vocabulary—sets specific constructive systematic theoretical tasks for the philosophy of language.

Rorty himself did not think that.

Rorty thinks that the whole battery of distinctively modern philosophical problems, descendants of those bequeathed to us by the Enlightenment epistemologists and philosophers of mind, will be dissolved if we reject the representational semantic metavocabularies in which they are framed and without which their questions (paradigmatically, those of object naturalism) cannot even be asked.

Instead, he counsels, along with the later Wittgenstein, we should adopt and employ only pragmatic metavocabularies, contenting ourselves with specifications of our discursive practices,

what we are *doing* in talking one way rather than another. We can ask how such practices come about (a historical question), how we learn to engage in them and teach them to others (a sociological question), and how they help us cope with our surround, solve practical problems that arise in the course of being us (a functional question). But these are all in a broad sense *empirical* questions, not distinctively *philosophical* ones.

This is radical pragmatism. What it is radical about is semantics. It is radical in rejecting the idea that there is any respectable work to be done by semantic metavocabularies. What cannot be done by pragmatic metavocabularies should be dismissed as not worth doing, as the attempt to answer questions that arise only because of deep and systematic confusions—specifically, representationalist ones.

Price and I both want to address systematically, in a pragmatic metavocabulary, to be sure, the question of what makes something a *discursive* practice at all.

This is the question of how to characterize ADPs: autonomous discursive practices, *language* games one could play though one played no other *language* games.

We find the answer to that (what is “downtown” in languaging) in *assertion*. Discursive practices are those in which some performances have the pragmatic significance of claimings.

Price thinks that in that practice we already see the emergence of a *semantic* notion of truth that outruns and is irreducible to both Rorty’s “cautionary use” of ‘true’ and the minimal, deflationary, broadly disquotational use. But in “Truth as Convenient Friction,” seeing this function in the capacity of assertions to serve as reasons *against* other assertions (and I have argued that the same point can be made w/res to their complementary function as reasons *for* other assertions—the key point being to look downstream to consequences of claiming rather than exclusively upstream to appropriate circumstances), he argues that in this way we can fund a more robust semantic notion of truth than the James-Dewey-Rorty tradition allows, and do so in terms wholly acceptable to pragmatists of this stripe—because and insofar as the discussion takes place entirely in a *pragmatic* metavocabulary, an account of the practices of using ordinary, nonsemantic vocabulary.

From this assertional way of theoretically demarcating discursive practices—a demarcation formulable entirely in a *pragmatic* metavocabulary—it follows that *declarative* sentences will be used in any ADP. This bit of syntactic MV becomes applicable just because the notion of assertion is appealed to in the pragmatic MV.

I think—and Price is cagy on the point—that this means also that the semantic notion of propositional content, expressed in a semantic MV, comes along, too.

Price distinguishes two notions of representation:

i) The *wider* notion of i-representation applies to declaratives as such.

It expresses what I’ve called the representational dimension of conceptual content as such. It includes the applicability of deflated, broadly disquotational ‘truth’ locutions, and intelligibility as having the job of fact-stating in its broadest sense—because facts just are true claims, not in the sense of true claimings but of true claimables, as Frege taught us (using his idiom of ‘thought’ for claimable).

ii) The *narrower* notion of e-representation applies only to *some* idioms that admit declaratives.

The mistake that Price and I join Rorty and Sellars as diagnosing, deploring, and criticizing is to think that an **e-representational semantic metavocabulary applies to declaratives as such**. This is global declarativist semantic representationalism or descriptivism.

The overall point I am after is that, properly understood, Rorty's linguistic pragmatism (pragmatism after the linguistic turn) calls pragmatist philosophers to a substantive, concrete, constructive, systematic theoretical task: **elaborating both *pragmatic* MVs** (that is what Pricean pragmatism enjoins, once we have divided through by the optional naturalist commitment: the commitment that the pragmatic MV should be a naturalistic one) **and** (this is the conclusion of the argument about embedding being an issue at the demarcational level of declaratives generally) ***semantic* MVs that are motivatable on pragmatist grounds, constructible with conceptual raw materials acceptable to a pragmatist.**

If and insofar as ADPs just as such have a representational dimension (as the ubiquity of *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitudes for declaratives indicates), it will be incumbent on pragmatist philosophers of language to account for that representational dimension in pragmatist terms.

Insofar as we want to insist that expressively adequate universal pragmatic MVs (those that do not omit or ignore essential elements of ADPs) must include, say, normative vocabulary, we owe a pragmatist demarcation and specification of "normative vocabulary."

This is the normative pragmatist's obligation that is parallel to the Pricean naturalist pragmatist's obligation to specify and demarcate naturalistic vocabulary. (Is it the vocabulary of fundamental physics? Of the special sciences? Of eventual, ideal natural science? Is it OED vocabulary in general?)

In bringing *second-wave* Humean expressivism into the pragmatist fold, Price has made it urgent for the pragmatism that results from his synthesis to take account of the Frege-Geach problem. That means accepting the need for and legitimacy of specifically *semantic* MVs, and, further, *semantic* MVs that make *formal* semantics possible.

Price does not acknowledge that in this way he has closed off the possibility of a *radical* pragmatism, in the sense of one that is globally antirepresentationalist by **rejecting the propriety of *semantic* MVs *tout court*.**

That is Wittgensteinian semantic nihilism. (Compare: Dummettian instrumentalism, which says that semantic MV is OK, but must be explicitly definable within the pragmatic MV.) And Blackburn, who does acknowledge that his expressivism must make room for semantics, does not talk about what a radical effect this requirement has on shape of pragmatism.

So in making his synthetic move, and broadening post-Rortyan pragmatism, Price has, without realizing it, obliged it to take the form of *moderate* antirepresentationalist pragmatism. It is moderate in that it acknowledges the need for a semantic MV, not just a pragmatic one, and one, further, that need not be explicitly definable in the terms of the pragmatic MV. (What is the status of this latter, anti-Dummettian commitment? Does it follow just from the acceptance of the need to respond to the Frege-Geach argument at a declarativist level?)

Since the need for an account of embeddable content, and so a full semantic MV (full in that it permits or supports formal semantics) occurs at the declarativist level, an antirepresentationalist semantics is also needed at that level.

That is global antirepresentationalism. An inferentialist semantics fits the bill nicely. And offering a *global* account of a representational dimension of declarativist content is compatible with offering a *narrow* account of descriptive or representational functioning whose paradigm is OED vocabulary.

The Frege-Geach argument reminds us that declarative sentences occur embedded as significant components in other sentences, not just free-standing. The embedded occurrences are not force-bearing, as the free-standing ones are. So we can't do just with an account of force or pragmatic significance, in a pragmatic MV (whether naturalistic or normative). We also need a notion of *content*: what the embedded occurrence contributes to the pragmatic significance of the compound.

According to a standard way of organizing a semantic theory, that will be via the contribution it makes to the *content* of the force-bearing compound.

The fact that compound sentences can themselves occur as embedded components of more complex sentences shows that we need to assign them contents, too.

So we will need a semantic MV to discuss these contents.

And we will need some version of a formal semantics, to deal with the forms of compounding.

A philosophical semantics discussing the practices that establish the association of contents (semantic interpretants, semantically relevant whatsises) with expressions will have to be formulated in a *mixed* pragmatic *and* semantic metavocabulary.

Global representationalism-descriptivism, we said, is the product of :

- i) a *declarativist* criterion of demarcation of the topic, and
- ii) a commitment to working to begin with in a *semantic* metavocabulary, and
- iii) adopting a *representationalist* semantic model.

Now, embedding is a phenomenon with declarativist scope.

That is, all declaratives can occur not only in free-standing, (so) force-bearing uses, that is, where their occurrence (“all on its own”) has a pragmatic significance—indeed, the pragmatic significance of an assertion, something that can be given as a reason and for which reasons can be given and which one can give reasons against—but also embedded uses, where the occurrence of the declarative makes a distinctive contribution to the pragmatic significance of the free-standing utterance in which it is embedded. (But note that there can be arbitrary levels of such embedding.)

Indeed, to a first approximation, syntactic declaratives are embeddables.

That is, **not only are all declaratives embeddable, but sentences that are arbitrarily embeddable are declaratives.** [This direction of the “iff” is a very bold linguistic claim. It will need more thought.]

For although questions (erotetic sentences) and commands (imperative sentences)—in the sense of sentences whose free-standing use has the pragmatic significance not of *assertions*, but of

questions and *commands*, respectively—can be embedded in other sentences, for instance, in declaratives, they are not arbitrarily embeddable or embeddable without restriction.

But: dealing with embedded occurrences is a specifically *semantic* problem.

Systematically codifying the contribution the embedded occurrence of sentences makes to the proprieties of use governing the compound sentences in which they occur is the task specifically of semantic theory.

Doing this requires introducing a notion of content.

And the task of semantic theories as such subdivides into two:

- a) Specifying a general notion of *content*, (a kind of
- b) Specifying the contribution the content of each embedded expression (to begin with sentences, but other parts of speech, such as singular terms, too, since sentences can occur embedded in them) makes to the *content* of sentences in which it occurs embedded as a (semantically significant) component.

At this stage the task is to compute *content* (of compounds) from *content* (of components), because the compound expressions (to begin with, sentences) can themselves occur embedded as semantically significant components of further compounds. (We can “build to the sky,” syntactically.)

What is a “semantically significant component” of what then becomes visible as a *compound* expression (to begin with, sentence) is to be determined *substitutionally*. (Here Gareth Evans’s “Generality Constraint” expresses appreciation of the same point.)

That is, one looks at pragmatic invariants (invariants of pragmatic significance of free-standing, force-bearing utterances of sentences) under substitution of (what then show up as) components of them. These assimilate both the compound sentences and the components discernible in them (not the ‘cat’ in ‘cattle’, even though we can substitute ‘rat’ and ‘bat’, and not the ‘sake’ in “I did it for her sake,”) into equivalence classes.

And this task ramifies along two dimensions:

- i. Compounds components are embedded in can themselves occur as embedded in further compounds, so the compounds themselves need to be assigned *semantic contents*, and not just *pragmatic significances*, and
- ii. Sentences can occur embedded in parts of speech (substitutionally discerned) other than just sentences: paradigmatically, in singular terms. (“The house that Jack built.”). So one will need to assign semantic contents to other parts of speech besides sentences, to take account of this sort of embedding.

4. Into this clear and cogent picture I introduce some substantial complications.

a) For, I want us to worry about a special class of idioms: *metavocabularies*.

Specifying *metavocabularies*, and distinguishing between pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic *metavocabularies*, takes place in

b) And, taking myself to be following Sellars in this point, I want to consider an even more special class of idioms: *categorial* *metavocabularies*.

This will be made even worse when I turn the crank one final time, and claim that categorial MV idioms such as modal and normative vocabularies get a derivative descriptive or e-representational fact-stating role in virtue of their primary, categorial (LX for every ADP) expressive role.

c) Further, I take it that properly dealing with declaratives requires a sufficiently robust semantic MV to do formal semantics in, since declaratives as such embed in other declaratives (and in other parts of speech). If and insofar as this is right, one cannot be a radical pragmatist in Rorty's sense, but only a semantically moderate pragmatist, since one does not reject semantic MVs as such.

d) My inferentialism gives a non-representationalist model (MV) for semantic content of all declaratives. On the basis of that inferentialist semantic MV, one can explain the i-representational dimension of discourse that admits declaratives. (One will want to appeal also to a social pragmatic MV, in order to tell the story about *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitude as the principal representational idioms of ordinary language.).

For Plan (4):

Stories I'm obliged to tell because of my redescription of Price's picture:

The concept of ADPs:

Assertion, giving and challenging reasons.

Two-sorted normative pragmatic MV: commitments/entitlements.

Inferential contents: looking upstream to circumstance of appropriate application and
downstream to appropriate consequences of application.

Categories: Unpicking the notions of elaboration and explication

Re categories (as LX for every ADP):

Terms introduced by *abstraction* are *elaborated from* the use of the antecedent vocabulary that counts as more concrete relative to that elaboration.

But they need not *explicate* anything. Number-words, above, might be an example.

Conversely: ordinary semantic and pragmatic MVs are *explicative of* the vocabularies for which they are metavocabularies. But they need not, and usually are not, *elaborable from* those target vocabularies.

Is the concept of a metavocabulary a representational concept?

The concept metavocabulary:

It might seem that the concept of a metavocabulary presupposes a representational semantics, and itself belongs to a representational semantic metavocabulary.

For isn't a metavocabulary a vocabulary that is *about*, that *represents* another vocabulary?

For instance, isn't Price's "object naturalism"/ "subject naturalism" distinction one that distinguishes theories that are *of or about the objects* talked about by a vocabulary vs. theories *of or about the practices or abilities of subjects* who use those vocabularies?

But we see that something has gone wrong here, because subject naturalism is supposed to be the paradigm of *expressivist*, rather than *representationalist* (meta)theories.

It is true that Tarskian-Carnapian uses of 'metalinguage' or 'metatheory'—the ancestors of my 'metavocabulary'—are characterized in representational semantic terms, even when it is syntactic or pragmatic metalanguages that are at issue. For they understand metalanguages in terms of the *referents* or *denotations* of the terms and predicates of the language in question. If they are nonlinguistic things, it is an "object language", and if it is linguistic things that form the referential domain, then it is a metalanguage: syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic (once those distinctions are fully in play, really only with the early Sellars) depending on what kind of *features* of linguistic expressions it is that they refer to.

But we *can* understand 'metavocabulary' in terms of *expression* rather than *representation*.

Here the notion of making explicit or explicating is crucial.

It depends on a notion of saying or making explicit that need not be understood representationally. The paradigm is the way in which *conditionals* explicate *implication* relations (relations of being a reason *for*) and *negation* explicates *incompatibility* relations (relations of being a reason *against*).

Q: Does *BSD* give an adequate expressive account of the relation of V' being a metavocabulary for (target vocabulary) V?

A: Yes. It is the notion of V-P sufficiency of one vocabulary for another.

The idea, for a pragmatic MV, is that **V' is an expressively adequate pragmatic metavocabulary for V just in case there is a theory in V', a set of sentences, such that whenever that set of sentences is true (holds) of a community or an individual, that community or individual [we are being noncommittal about the practice/ability distinction], that community or individual is using the expressions of V so as to confer on them the meanings of the vocabulary-in-use V.**

The use of 'true' in this formulation is disquotational-deflatable: for the set of sentences of V' that is the characterizing theory T, we can say: *if T*, then the community is using V (so as to confer or deploy the expressions of V with the V-appropriate meanings).

Here there is, if you like, a reference to the users, but it is what they theory in V' *expresses*, what it *says* that matters.

For semantic MV things are a bit more complicated. For here it matters whether we are doing philosophical semantics (which requires a combined pragmatic-semantic MV) or just formal semantics (which would be conducted in a 'pure' semantic MV).

The key point however, is this: **for each kind of metavocabulary, we are going to specify it by offering a pragmatic metavocabulary (a pragmatic metametavocabulary) for it.** Doing it that way is what giving an *expressivist* account, rather than a *representational semantic* account consists in.

That last claim is justified by the reading I gave of Price's "object naturalism" / "subject naturalism" distinction, "dividing through by the naturalism." For the pragmatist idea of subject naturalism was paraphrased as using a naturalistic *pragmatic* metavocabulary to specify the practices of *using* the

vocabulary (respectively: the abilities one needs to exercise), rather than the objects one is taken to be talking *about*, which would be in a naturalistic representational *semantic* metavocabulary.

The current point is that that is exactly what we do to specify the concept of a metavocabulary: we give our account in a *pragmatic* metametavocabulary. Thus it is in this sense a pragmatist-expressivist account.

It is in this same sense (and in the same spirit) that I specify the concept of an autonomous discursive practice (ADP): by saying what one needs to *do* in order thereby to be engaging in one.

That is a pragmatist-expressivist specification, in a *pragmatic* metavocabulary (whether or not in a naturalistic one).

For Plan (5):

Metaphysical Vocabulary:

The philosophic counsel epitomized in Rorty's 'vocabulary' vocabulary is that if you are interested in metaphysics, you should pay particular attention to its vocabulary: the metaphysical vocabulary.

This is a metametaphysical point.

And one of the questions one should ask about the metaphysical idiom is how it is related to representational semantic *metavocables*.

(I think that basically us old-fashioned philosophers of language think that metaphysical vocabularies are disguised semantic metavocables, and we pragmatist philosophers of language suspect that they have representationalist presuppositions.

Whereas it is of the essence of the metaphysical revolution to insist that metaphysical vocabularies are not metavocables at all: they are not about linguistic expressions or how we talk or what we are doing in talking certain ways. They are in a distinctive way about the things we are talking about. (There is the representationalist semantic presupposition.). And it is an interesting and important question *how* they are about what we ordinarily talk about—that is, what makes talk about those things (not about our talk about them) specifically *metaphysical*, what makes the vocabulary employed, the metaphysicians' use-vocabulary, qualify as a *metaphysical* vocabulary.

Number talk and the use of numerals:

Give example of the use of number-words (numerals) introduced by counting (so, elaborated from the use of sortals, in the way Frege gives us in the *Grundlagen*). We can then say how other practices are elaborated from there: addition, multiplication, arithmetic....

We don't need to *use* (as opposed to mention) number-words in telling that story.

(This version of Eliatic criterion is not satisfied.)

This is a story in a pragmatic MV, not a representational semantic MV, which would raise specifically *metaphysical* worries about the nature of numbers.

Cf. Hale & Wright's neo-Fregean account, in terms of 1-1 correspondences.

One key point is that we do *not* need to *use* (as opposed to mention—OK, a very special kind of use, as McDowell reminds us) numerals or number-words in our pragmatic MV specifying practices sufficient for using numerals *as* numerals, in counting and doing arithmetic.

Normative pragmatic metavocabularies,

and the prospects for semantic metavocabularies for normative idioms:

Re normative pragmatic MVs:

Don't ask (to begin with) what it is for norms to be implicit in social practices.

(In fact, don't ask, with Stephen Turner, what social practices *are*. The ontological question has object-naturalist presuppositions (in ST's case, methodologically individualist ones.).

Ask how normative metavocabulary is used, the distinctive expressive functions it performs.

In the case of normative pragmatic MVs (being contrasted with naturalistic ones), they are appropriate wherever practices of *appraisal* are found. Appraisal is of the correctness, or propriety of performances, their being better or worse done, or appealed to in justifying attribution of normative statuses of commitment and entitlement, responsibility and authority.

Appraisals, in turn, are to be understood in terms of practical reasoning.

Appraisals are appealed to in giving reasons for or reasons against *doing* things.

Delineating, demarcating, normative vocabulary, which is categorial: universally LX, LX for every ADP, although not fully explicative: it explicates only *one* aspect that every ADP must exhibit.

So normative vocabulary can be elaborated from *any* ADP, and will be *partially* explicative of *any* ADP: that one, or any other.

Practical reasoning is giving reasons for and against *doing* things that are not (in general) sayings.

This whole area calls out to be cleaned up conceptually. Doing that is articulating a definite concept of *normative* pragmatic metavocabulary, in a way acceptable to a pragmatist.

Should discuss and further articulate the pragmatist-expressive account of *normative* vocabulary. This is an account in a pragmatic MV of the *use* of normative vocabulary (and idiom, and one that I claim is categorial: LX for every ADP).

Might start with

i. Distinguishing practical reasoning from doxastic-theoretical reasoning.

At the level of use, this is giving reasons for and against (defending and challenging) *practical* commitments: commitments to *do* something, in a sense of doing that is not restricted to (doings that are) sayings.

Background: doings that are not sayings are also performances that are like doings that are sayings in that

a) one can be rationally *challenged*, by others (or oneself, in the parasitic limit) giving reasons *against* doing that, and

b) can defend one's (entitlement to that) performance by giving reasons *for* it.

This practice is parasitic on the practice of giving and challenging (giving reasons for and against) (commitment to) doxastic claimables, in that the reasons given centrally, and at base, include (commitments to) claimables. If one could not give reasons for doxastic claimables, one could not give them for doables.

This connection, via reasons for and reasons against, gives practical commitments conceptual (=inferentially articulated) contents that are at least analogous to propositional contents.

Two alternative ways to go here are:

- Treat them as propositional contents, but with an additional operator: Belnap's STIT (see to it that) or
- Treat them as analogous to but different from propositions, Castaneda's "practitions", Kant's "maxims".

ii. Davidson's account of "complete reasons" in practical reasoning:

In addition to claimables, *complete* practical reasons (for and against) have to be supplemented by specifically practical ones.

He thinks of these as expressions of *desires*, but as including "pro-attitudes."

He is thinking of "internal" Humean reasons: reasons derived from motivational structure, motivating reasons.

But if for "expression of pro-attitude" we substitute "normative claim", we can get a formula that includes "external" Kantian reasons.

In this sense "she asked me to do it" is a good reason, all by itself.

The fact that it can be overridden if I have reason *not* to do what she asks does not show that it is not a reason all by itself. And it does not show that it is not such a reason (entitling me, albeit defeasibly, to the practical commitment) even if it does not in fact motivate me.

iii. Twist: think of the additional practical component, that Davidson thinks must be added to the doxastic commitments (beliefs) as reasons, not as additional premises, but as codifying commitment to *patterns of practical reasoning*. In this way they would be analogous to conditionals, as Sellars conceives them.

They express rules in accordance with which to reason, not premises from which to reason, in Mill's terminology. (Cf. Lewis Carroll's "Achilles and the Tortoise".)

iv. Three kinds of rational 'ought', codifying three different kinds of practical reasoning:

- Instrumental (valid only for individual agent, depending on desires/preferences)
- Social (valid for holders of social status, e.g. bank employee, parent)
- General (possibly one feature of moral)

All of this is offering a pragmatic metavocabulary to pick out the expressive role characteristic of normative vocabulary as such. If one understands how such vocabularies work, how one learns them, how they are correctly used, etc., one need not go on to as the "object-naturalist" (representationalist semantic MV) question of whether there are norms, and what and where they are.

As to the claimed categorial character of normative vocabulary:

- The first claim is that every ADP must include practical reasoning.
- The second claim is that if one engages in such reasoning, and distinguishes materially good from materially bad practical reasoning (reasons for and against entitlement to

practical commitments), however fallibly, then one already knows how to do everything one needs to know how to do to grasp (master the use of a word) normative concepts. One's abilities just need to be suitably recruited to use 'oughts' where one acknowledges or attributes commitments to the goodness of patterns of practical reasoning. This is the claim that the use of the normative pragmatic MV idiom can be "elaborated from" the use of the target object vocabulary in which one reasons practically (an idiom of the ADP).

- The third claim is that normative claims explicate, make explicit, features of the practices, the use of the target vocabulary of practical reasoning, from which they are elaborated. They let one *say that* a pattern of practical reasoning is good: something one could distinguish in practice (take or treat in practice as good or bad) before.

All three of these are at least colorable claims.

- Does this qualification as categorial MV idiom mean that there are no normative facts? No. Even in the narrow sense, can see normative vocabulary as fact-stating. In fact, can see it as epistemically tracking and normatively governed by normative facts.
- Can understand us as noninferentially reporting (perceiving) normative states of affairs.

Need two-factor account: RDRDs plus application of normative concepts.

Can have that.

E-Representation and Narrowly Descriptive Idioms

Considerations to assemble in specifying various narrow (E-representational) senses of "descriptive":

- i) Isomorphism-picturing. Model is inferential connection between map-facts and terrain-facts, specified in map-vocabulary and terrain-vocabulary.

This is one thing to mean by Spinozistic "order and connection" of ideas and things.

Problem: isomorphisms come too cheap.

Being a model of, in the model-theoretic sense, is a relation we can always establish if we can gerrymander descriptions in the metavocabulary in which we specify the relational structure.

Pick a set of sentences describing your brain in a neurophysiological vocabulary: the theory.

Then pick an arbitrary physical object, a chunk of rock.

One can pick arbitrary s-t regions of the rock as domain elements, and then gerrymander sets of them for the predicates, to make a relational structure that is a model of the theory.

- ii) Tracking. This is basically subjunctively robust isomorphism. Fodor's "one-way counterfactual dependencies." This is *much* tougher to gerrymander.

This is what Price goes for.

- iii) Further: Could require that the description be *empirical*. (Cf. OED, ordinary *empirical* descriptive vocabularies). For this, *justification* of claims (a normative

matter) must depend in a distinctive way on *observation*, on noninferential reports.

I'll give a two-ply account: RDRDs (tracking) plus response being application of relevant concepts.

And I'll claim this criterion of demarcation of *empirical* descriptiveness (subjunctively robust tracking, an alethic modal matter, plus empirical evidential structure, a normative-evidential-reasoning matter, added to tracking) can be satisfied in case of normative vocabulary. (If one has been brought up correctly, one can respond noninferentially to paradigmatic acts of cruelty *as* cruel.)

Picking out e-representational *semantic* metavocabularies:

A hierarchy of generalized Eliatic criteria.

By *generalized* Eliatic criterion I do not mean (yet) to invoke *causal* connections.

I mean that in giving a certain kind of explanation (ultimately, a semantic one), one needs to *use*, and not just *mention* the terms in the target vocabulary (used to specify terrain facts).

All of (i), (ii), and (iii) above are semantic metavocabularies in this generalized Eliatic sense.

Notice that we have seen two ways of identifying and demarcating the concept of e-representational semantic metavocabulary:

1) Denotational-Picturing: In a broadly Tractarian-Tarskian way. Singular terms are taken to refer to or represent (or to purport to do so) individual objects in a way modeled on the name-bearer, 'Fido'-Fido relationship. Regardless of how that paradigmatic semantic representational relationship is established, what is established is taken to be, understood as, the same kind of semantic relationship. One-place predicates are then taken to represent *sets* of objects (or possible) objects, and relational predicates tuples of them, while holding the conception of the denotational relation constant (*mutatis mutandis*). The possible worlds framework, thought of as a *semantic* MV, is a development of this Tarski-Carnap-Quine conception, rooted in the picture theory of the *Tractatus*.

The static, model-theoretic semantic representationalist picture is expressible in an *extensional* metavocabulary. Even the possible-worlds framework is. That it is possible to give a semantics for intensional modal expressions in a purely extensional metavocabulary is supposed to be one of its signal advantages.

The other alternative specification of e-representational semantic metavocabularies employs a richer, modal metavocabulary.

2) Modal Tracking: This is understanding e-representation in terms of *tracking* relations between representings and representeds. Fodor's "one-way counterfactual dependencies" are a cardinal instance of this strategy. It is the essence of Sellars's notion of picturing. And it is Price's candidate for responding to the "bifurcationist" challenge: distinguishing within the realm of idioms that admit declaratives, idioms that are *descriptive* or *representational* in a narrow sense from those that should be given an exclusively expressivist account, having a representational dimension only in the "quasi-realist" i-representational sense that goes with declaratives as such.

The idea, I think, is that these subjunctively robust relations, instituted by regularities of practice (norms or dispositions of use of expressions), as specified in a suitable philosophical semantic MV, then establish the static denotational relations of representation in sense (1).

I suggest a variant of (2):

3) Epistemic tracking (alethic modal MV) plus normative governance (deontic normative MV). As a still more demanding way of functionally specifying a narrow notion demarcating descriptive or e-representational idioms.

Claim: Can understand *normative vocabulary as empirically descriptive in this sense.*

One central criticism of the global e-representationalist picture is its metaphysical extravagance: the sheer variety of kinds of facts that must be postulated to semantically interpret every idiom that admits declaratives.

From “Global Anti-Representationalism?”

What are we to conclude? Rorty and Price agree that the evils representationalism is prey to require, or at least make advisable, global anti-representationalism. The sort of expressivist, deflationary, pragmatic account of what one is *doing* in *using* representational vocabulary that I am advocating suggests that this response is an overreaction. I have tried in this essay to assemble some analytic materials that might help us towards a more nuanced conclusion. Once one has freed oneself from the idea (and the auxiliary hypotheses that enforce the association)

- that semantic representationalism need take a nominalist
- or atomist form,
- must fail to appreciate what is special about sentences,
- or has to enforce a disconnection between semantic issues of meaning and epistemic ones pertaining to understanding,

representational vocabulary can be understood as performing an important, indeed essential, expressive role in making explicit a discursive representational dimension of semantic content that necessarily helps articulate every autonomous discursive practice.